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ABSTRACT 
Corporate governance reform, which arose from the beginning of 21 
century, has effectively promoted the adoption of top management incentive 
plans in listed companies. This dissertation empirically tests the effectiveness of 
the adoption of top management incentive plans and other regulations issued by 
Chinese Security Regulation Committee (“CSRC”).We expect to provide certain 
useful information and ideas for the reform and development of those top 
management incentive arrangements in future. 
In theory, contract mechanism and monitoring mechanism are regarded as 
two important institutional arrangements about managerial incentive. Building 
on these two mechanisms, this dissertation establishes a theoretical framework 
and examines the potential relationship between top management compensation 
and corporate performance, and governance structure, as well as related factors 
that may affect the transparency of top management compensation. Main topics 
include: (1) Based on contract mechanism, testing the relationship between top 
management compensation (and its change) and corporate performance (and its 
change). Does performance-based compensation affect subsequent corporate 
performance? (2) From monitoring mechanism perspective, investigating the 
influences of board of directors, supervisory board and ownership structure on 
top management compensation along with the impact on the implement of 
management incentive contract. (3) The compensation of independent director, 
who is considered as one of important monitoring forces, is analyzed separately 
grounding on its potential effects on the independence of independent director. 
Topics to be tested consist of the determinants of independent director 
compensation and its correlation with top management compensation. (4) 
Placing on the viewpoint of information asymmetry conduced to managerial 
incentive, to explore the effect of top management compensation and of 
corporate governance structure characteristics on compensation transparency. 
Research results from this dissertation indicate: (1) Management incentive 
system has begun to function in listed companies, and performance-based pay 
has been approved by significant evidence. And the research also shows that the 
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performance. But no evidence ever shows that company with higher 
pay-performance relation performs better in subsequent periods. (2) To some 
extent, corporate governance structure has its influences on top management pay. 
It reveals us the fact that CEO seated as board chair simultaneously, the higher 
ownership of top management, the higher of top management remuneration. 
Board size, the percentage of director who holds corporate stock equity seated 
on board, supervisory board size, blockholder ownership and its control abilities 
have statistically significant negative relationship with management 
compensation. Compensation committee has begun to appear, but no evidence 
confirms that it has effect on top management compensation and 
pay-performance sensitivity. (3) Company size, firm performance, board 
structure and ownership structure potentially affect independent director 
compensation. And statistically, there is a significant positive correlation 
between compensation of top management (and its change) and that of 
independent director (and its change). (4) Top management compensation 
transparency disclosure rule has been affirmed. “Good news (relatively low 
compensation, or management does not raise their pay) has higher transparency, 
and bad news (relatively high compensation, or the rise of management pay) has 
lower transparency.” Besides, top management compensation transparency has a 
negative association with company size and listed year, and has a positive 
association with the adoption of top management incentive plan. 
This dissertation contributes to top management compensation incentive 
literature by: (1) Examining the causalities between top management pay and 
corporate performance. (2) Completely investigating the impacts of corporate 
governance structure on top management compensation, and analyzing the 
characteristics of compensation committee of listed companies and its effect on 
pay-performance relation. (3) Testing the colleration between independent 
director and top management by the metric of compensation. (4) Designing 
compensation transparency index to explore top management compensation 
information disclosure rule. According to the author’s literature review, it is the 
first time to empirically test these topics in mainland China. 
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